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One of the best known things about my native country, Brazil, is the 
biodiversity of the Amazon. Whoever knows this region of the world is able to 
easily understand that one of the most important marks of life as a whole is 
diversity, an impressive phenomenon when we pay attention to numbers: 
7,010,000 Km2, 9 countries (Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, 
Suriname, French Guiana, Ecuador and Brazil), 5% of the earth’s surface, 40% 
of South America, 20% of world reserves of unfrozen water, 34% of the world 
forest reserve, 1,100 rivers, the largest river in the world (Maran  on-Solimo  es-
Amazonas, with 6,671 Km), 15% of the water entering the oceans, 30% of the 
world’s fauna and flora, around 55,000 species of plants (22% of the world’s 
species), 1000 birds, 300 mammals (among 4,650 of the world), 550 reptiles, 
163 amphibians, 3,000 fish, millions of insects and microorganisms. Of course, 
the Amazon is not the only region of the world with such a diversity of living 
beings, but it is certainly one of the most important scenarios for those who 
want to understand life and how species diversity is one of the central criteria 
for how each one of these life forms can survive in time and space. One 
important thing to note is that the biodiversity of the Amazon also includes 
the socio-diversity, that is, the different forms of human life that live there: 23 
million of people, 688 municipalities, 163 indigenous groups of people, with 
208,000 people (60% of the indigenous population of Brazil), 160 different 
languages in 14 linguistic trunks and 11 isolated languages. Faced with this 
scenario, Euclides da Cunha, an important Brazilian writer, said: “the Amazon, 
even from a strictly physical aspect, we know it to shreds. More than a century 
of research and persevering an invaluable literature, numerous monographs, 
shows it to us in countless instalments of aspects. [...] Human intelligence 
would not support, suddenly, the weight of that power loaded reality” (Cunha 
2000, 23).
This means that the human mind collapses in the face of such a great reality 
in terms of biodiversity, because the reason cannot account for all the 
elements that make up this great spectacle of life. This is the problem that 
begins to appear when we think on the technical-scientific rationality 
that tends to dominate (Hans Jonas refers to it as a “will to unlimited 
power” [Jonas 2013, 34]) to use reality exclusively for the benefit of the 
human being. The result of 
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this typically modern use of technology is the reduction of life: through 
monoculture, planting exotic forests (such as eucalyptus and pine, for 
example), the large-scale breeding of animals, the standardization of diet, 
habitat destruction, the introduction of exotic species, the overuse of natural 
resources, the application of agrochemicals and other agricultural inputs, the 
introduction of new species and the soil and water pollution, etc. 
In such way, the modern will to domination and exploit nature is, through 
technology, designing a new future. The main face of this new reality is the 
total control over life, just as transhumanists, for example, insist. Therefore, it 
is increasingly necessary to reduce diversity to something knowable: only 
what is knowable can be controlled. This is the kind of future that has been 
shown by science fiction films: in the name of equality – and therefore for 
something good – we can and we must reduce diversity. It means that the 
multiplicity of life forms should be reduced to the rules of rationality, albeit at 
a high cost in the sense that the complexity of life may remain an enigma for 
human instrumental reason. The resulting problem of this process is that the 
impoverishment of biodiversity also means the impoverishment of human life. 
It means that the future of our lives becomes a kind of game, through a very 
risky bet that makes us enjoy all the natural resources in the present in an 
irresponsible way, compromising the satisfaction of the needs and also the 
existence of future generations. This process of impoverishment of life is 
therefore an unsustainable process and requires an ethical position. This is the 
central concern of the work of the Jewish-German philosopher Hans Jonas: for 
him, it’s necessary and even urgent to look after the future with more 
responsibility. 
1. Hope Or Fear?
In that sense, the technological power of engendering our future, both from an 
anthropological point of view (by reconfiguring the man by the so-called 
technological convergence, something that is seen as an overcoming of the 
human into the posthuman and its transhuman versions) and an evolutionary-
cosmological point of view (which includes the general reform of life and the 
environment) brings the problem of the future to the centre of philosophical 
reflection. Overall, there are two perspectives: either we look after the future 
with hope or with fear. The first hypothesis is based on a positive, utopian 
outlook and the belief that technology is the instrument of healing the limits 
imposed by nature and has in Ernst Bloch one of its first and most forceful 
thinkers (after Francis Bacon). Following a Marxist view, The Principle of Hope 
(three volumes: 1954, 1955,  1959) begins with the conviction that a 
classless society guided by work and technology could lead humanity to 
happiness. This proposal is criticized by Hans Jonas in his The Imperative of 
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Responsibility (1979), in which the hypothesis of fear is considered a necessary 
heuristic, i.e., an alert and an ethical alternative to utopia. Fear is, for Jonas, a 
benefit that provides a look into the future from the malum, i.e., the risks and 
the threats contained in present human actions. As a heuristic imperative, for 
Jonas, fear is a feeling that stimulates the reflective capacity: its internal 
mechanism is not a feeling of anxiety or distress or even powerlessness or 
weakness, but a reflective premise about dangers which become actual to the 
extent that the possibilities of its realization are shown. Being fear, this feeling 
would simply be an altered state of consciousness and it would be out of the 
ethical field. Therefore, it is not about creating some kind of exaggerated and 
anxious attention or a sensation of panic before what it is, experienced in 
advance from the stimulus produced by imagination. Fear, for Jonas, is not 
something pathological, merely derived from the sensibility of an involuntary 
affectation. As an ethical component, it is something practical, i.e., controlled 
by will and/or rationality. For that reason, fear is not a principle of paralysis 
or escape from danger, but it leads to face the situation in an attempt to 
properly orient the action, avoiding that what was imaginatively projected 
happen. The danger to be faced, contrary to that one which leads to escape or 
inertia, holds the potential of something that must be respected due to the real 
possibility that the threat happens. 
In Jonas, fear is an element conditioned to the species’ survival and to the 
authenticity of the image of man: that is, it is not only a political element, but 
cosmic and ontological, after being also ethical. But it, instead of leading to a 
reduction of freedom and autonomy, it would represent a possibility to its use, 
since the retaking of its ethical positivity assumes the character of a reflection 
on the possible danger. Everything works as fear was a result from an 
imaginative artifice of the worst prognosis towards future at a time that hope 
and utopian enthusiasm seemed to replace the individual and collective 
responsibility for the assurance of the continuation of life. Facing the danger of 
an ultimate evil, imagined as a risk brought by techne, Jonas makes fear an 
element which would prevent mankind from its disappearance, either 
substantial (the end of the species) or formal (the authenticity of human life). 
Fear is, for Jonas, an ethical alternative against hope because can be a good 
chance to reflect about the dangers of our actions. 
That’s how fear is presented as an ethical alternative before enthusiasm and 
naivety which the success of techne have been accepted and practiced in all 
fields of human society, under the label of the utopia of progress which intends 
to reframe and improve nature in general and the nature of man itself. For 
Jonas, the technical power is “drunk with itself” (Jonas 1998, 142). This utopia 
has moved techne forward, facing it as harmless or preferring optimistic 
projections of future, which on the one hand believe that technique is always 
used with good purposes and because of it no kind of restriction is need and 
on the other hand in case it causes some harmful consequence, it itself will be 
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able to correct this loss. Techne, according to this view, would build up the best 
possibilities and the least risks, that’s why it would be able to create «the best 
of the possible worlds», annulling the clear ambiguity of all human acts. The 
annulment of this ambiguity is the annulment of the ethical possibility, since 
ethics just exists where man is aware his acts may be either good or bad and 
due to it they need to be analysed by reflection. 
In this sense, Jonas (and Bloch) thinks the future product of the actions of the 
present and takes advantage of a “comparative futurology” (a futuristic 
projection from the articulation of different knowledges) to invoke the need 
for humanity of now to be committed to the continuity of life tomorrow. The 
future in this case is a projected causality: it serves as a guide to present 
actions. How we see the future, with hope or with fear, affects our actions in 
the present. 
As Avishag Zafrani suggested in her book Le défi du nihilisme (2014, 
13) the problem of the future comes with the question of “finalism” - or
finality: Bloch follows the line of the end of history determined by “an utopian
tendency of human consciousness”, i.e., the idea that history ends well, that
there is always a “happy ending”, as something inscribed “in the being of man”
as something inherent, meaning, as a value. End and value are central themes
in the ethical proposal of Hans Jonas, for whom fear does make us see the end
as a negative projection, whose result would be the affirmation of the value
and good that must be preserved. The fear, therefore, does not appear as a
pessimistic concept, because the “will of negation”, in this case (it is necessary
to predict the evil so that it does not happen), would have a heuristic result,
precisely the affirmation of the life value as a Good to be safeguarded. For
Jonas, the moral obligation, therefore, is already inscribed in the being (in the
sense that life says “yes” to itself, choosing the purpose and affirming its
value), which gives his ethics an ontological foundation that reinserts the
purpose into nature in general and life in particular. Refusing both
anthropocentrism and the modern ontology of death that treats nature as a
mere inert matter (and to which, consequently, life remains an indecipherable
enigma, since it cannot be explained by either the materialist monism nor by
idealistic monism) Jonas carries forward the ambitious hypothesis that finality
and value are the characteristics of life – not just part of the human world.
In Jonas, as well as in Bloch, the concepts of End and Value present themselves
as an alternative to the nihilistic tendency of the philosophies of the twentieth
century, especially those that were fuelled by Nietzsche’s philosophy. Jonas
goes even further, saying that the existentialism of Sein und Zeit, for example,
keeps the same nihilistic character of the Ancient Gnostic movements,
aggravated by an indifference to nature. Reflecting on the future, in this case,
requires not only a new philosophy of history, but an act of rebellion against
this nihilistic trend, which explains the urgency of a new ethics, whose
background are some of the greatest crimes of recent human history, practiced
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in the twentieth century with the instruments provided by technological 
power: the atomic bomb, the experiments with humans and the extinction of 
life on a large scale. What is at risk, therefore, is the diversity of forms of life 
saved until now by evolutionary history, since the technology works according 
to the standardization process – by redesigning the future it standardizes it 
according to the values of our present time. That was what occurred during 
the Second World War and which is still in process today. All this could be 
among the most harmful consequences of nihilism. 
2. Nihilism: A crisis of Future
Nihilism has been characterized both as a teleological crisis (there is no 
meaning and no purpose), as an evaluative crisis (there is no ethical guarantee 
on the good or evil of the actions) and as a result, from the point of view of 
history, as demonstrated by Gianni Vattimo in his book The End of Modernity, 
as a rejection of the idea of progress as a result of successive overruns. 
Thinking against modernity is not merely the creation of a new framework for 
thinking, but a refusal to think in structures, a refusal to fall into the structural 
logic of thought, an abdication of the foundation of the notion of thinking and, 
ultimately, the idea that rationality offers some foundation to understanding 
existence. That would be the modus operandi of the nihilistic propensity of 
postmodernity: a rejection of the idea of overcoming and transcendence as 
modern categories, which characterize the way of making history that is 
widely criticized by Nietzsche already in his Untimely Meditations on History. 
From this point of view, nihilism denies all “stable structures of being” 
(Vattimo 1996, VIII) and, consequently, any teleological perspective of the 
future, from now on, oriented by its own eventual and accidental becoming. 
The utopia of hope in that case faces nihilism because it recovers the teleology 
of an overcoming of capitalism’s historical contradictions toward an ideal 
paradigm of society, using, for this, the technological tools. The heuristics of 
fear, on the other hand, recovers the idea of finality as an intrinsic biological 
and ethical element of living organisms, for which technology is presented as a 
danger. One of the most controversial forms of future projection in our days is 
called transhumanism. Francis Fukuyama, a notorious critic of this movement, 
said transhumanism “is the most dangerous idea in the world” (2004). But 
why is this dangerous? The denial of human diversity: the quest for control a 
central focus of transhumanism – requires standardization. Control is 
becoming predictable, uniform. 
Therefore, it is possible to demonstrate how transhumanists and those who 
herald the improvement of the human on one side, and the so-called 
bioconservatives on the other, present ways of confronting nihilism, but in 
different ways. The first are supporters of hope; the second, of fear. The first 
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design the future from their utopias and believe in technology as an ethical 
imperative of humankind. The second, believe that there is no guarantee that 
the future, built by the hands of technological power, can be good and much 
less than the technology can heal wounds that its herself created. In this case, 
in dubio pro malo. And what could the latter criticize in the first? Technology 
lacks a purpose, a for what, without which it is delivered to a continued 
progress emptied of any alternative. Technology is part of the “metaphysical 
neutralization of the human image”: it wants to reconfigure humanity without 
having a model (supporters of meliorism are moved by the “ontology of ‘not 
being yet’” or the “unfinished being”, that Jonas refers to in the penultimate 
item of his book). In this sense, transhumanism, even presenting itself as an 
alternative to nihilism, would eventually fall on their own plot: [1] the absence 
of finality (technology never reaches a saturation point – there is always 
something more to be explored; it is drunk of itself; self-referenced) and [2] 
the lack of value (or at least a definition of the value to be pursued – who said 
to remember is better than to forget that to control the emotions is better than 
feeling them, that not to die is better than dying, etc. (Hauskeller 2014) – 
better is not always good – say the critics of the unbridled advancement of 
technology, this new unchained Prometheus). 
3. Technology: A Cure or a Risk?
The two questions above put us right in the centre of the bioethical thought of
Hans Jonas and what we understand as their developments in the
contemporary world, the so-called Enhancement Project of the human being
widely advocated by the transhumanists (and some of the post-humanists).
Transhumanism is the philosophy (or ideology) that endorses the promises of
improvement that aims to transform the human in a post-human way through
technology. It is a thought that takes theoretical outlines and heated debates in
the academic world but also in our daily lives, as it is assumed by many
spheres of culture, from the cinema to the porn industry, supported by
impressive marketing campaigns that try to convince us that is possible,
necessary and even morally obligatory, to design a better future for the human
being. The outlook was summed up by Michael Hauskeller, for whom the
projection of the human into the future starts with the conviction that “the
present condition of mankind is completely deplorable and, in fact, an
unhealthy state” (2014, 131). This means that the human’s present is only a
being ontologically ill for which biotechnology is presented as a cure. One of
his illnesses is his ontological and behavioural change, which prevents
predictability and control; but not only human nature, but nature in general
needs to be reformed according to the anthropocentric criterion characteristic
of this type of process. Diversity, therefore, becomes necessarily something
undesirable, something that must be denied in the name of the
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standardization of behaviours, the equality of desirable performance 
conditions, genetic improvement and/or the effectiveness of transgenic 
processes (which ultimately lead to ontological changes denying one’s own 
“identities” in the name of a blend of elements and characteristics). 
In this sense, the Enhancement Project becomes widespread as a kind of moral 
obligation and transhumanism gains the appearances of a medicine for 
humanity. This means that the old question about the medical function, the 
way it was formulated by Jonas in the work of 1985 Technology, medicine and 
ethics, for example, (especially the seventh chapter, which deals with the 
“medical art and human responsibility”) no longer makes sense: there is no 
more difference between therapy and enhancement, or between cure and 
improvement in man, or between repairing a dysfunction and improving a 
function. It is now installing the kingdom where we will all finally be “equal” 
(and this is stated as a big advantage by transhumanists) because we will have 
the same powers of control, the price, to be uniform and standardized, as is 
strongly suggested by the Science Fiction Movies. 
Jonas’s projections, his questions and his concerns about the ethics of 
such research have never been so actual. If before, the art of medicine – now 
covered with new technological labels – is no longer an “art of cure”, i.e. the 
“re-establishment of a state” (Jonas 2006, 155) who was not itself, as 
amended, and thus kept as a “natural state or as close to it as possible” (Jonas 
2006, 155), now medicine is presented as a change in human nature itself. The 
physician is not the one that heals, but “the artist’s body with open ends” 
(Jonas 2006, 159), acting in the “uncertainty of our knowledge about the 
meaning of human existence” (Jonas 2006, 170) prepared by a “will to 
unlimited power” (Jonas 2013, 34). So For the Enhancement Project, the cure 
of humanity evokes, on the one hand, an ethical sense: it is necessary to cure 
humanity from itself; and the other, an ontological sense: the cure is not to re-
establish a natural state lost but to overcome the limits imposed by nature. 
Understanding the man as a being ontologically ill due to the limitations that 
are imposed on him by his nature (or condition) the improvement is, in itself, a 
therapy whose benefits are broken down into treatments aimed at controlling 
emotions, expanding cognitive abilities, improving relationships, enhancing 
sexual performance, extending life, increasing strength and beauty, preventing 
diseases, etc. In addition, examples of practical life and the way we access 
medicine and its interventions, give proof that the borders are in fact diluted in 
order to stress the differences seem something quite idle. We should note, 
however, that this finding only confirms the moral argument that the best is 
always good in itself. The blurring of boundaries in this case is an ingenious 
strategy for the utopias of continued progress biogeneticists and bioethicists 
carry forward. Our future is in this sense quite uncertain. In order to prevent a 
catastrophe, ethical thinking should be able to analyse the arguments and 
highlight the dangers of this type of procedure, not necessarily to cancel it, but 
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to clarify its risks. We cannot let the future be a place or a state of losing the 
power to be diverse and different. If so, you better stop here, don’t you think? 
It is urgent to save the Amazon. It is urgent to save life. 
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Nihilism and the Problem of Future 
Abstract. Starting from the example of the Amazon, in Brazil, we intend 
to analyse how technology (mainly in its biotechnological face) appears 
as a threat to biodiversity, insofar as it acts through a reduction 
and standardization: technology needs to reduce diversity to something 
knowable to be able to control and exploit, in view of human necessities. In 
this sense, according to Hans Jonas, it is necessary to ask about the horizon of 
the future giving preference to the negative prognosis (fear rather than 
hope) to avoid that the harmful consequences of nihilism (marked by the 
absence of criteria capable of guiding technological action) affect life 
decisively. In this case, the Enhancement project proposed by 
transhumanism appears as yet another chapter in the history of risks 
represented by modern technology. 
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